In order for this Republic to properly function it is imperative
that our law enforcement institutions perform their stated duties and uphold
and enforce the law. In addition, we are dependent upon a free press to inform
the people and provide them an accounting of how our institutions and elected
public officials perform. Lastly, those public institutions that hold
themselves up as guardians of the public trust also must perform according to
their stated missions. Unfortunately, none of these three groups have met those
challenges during the Transcam and Landscam travesties in California over the
last three decades.
Having received some subtle, and not so subtle discouragements,
and feeling like Jake Gittes in Robert Towne’s film Chinatown, in 1998 I began
to have concerns about my safety, so I visited the FBI. I went to The Phillip
Burton Federal Building near San Francisco City Hall, took the elevator up to
the 9th floor where the office of the FBI is located and told the receptionist
I wanted to speak to an investigative agent; with visions of nose-slitting
dancing in my head.
In good time, a young woman appeared. “Mr. Trainor? I’m Special
Agent Nancy Devane,” she said. “Please tell me what brought you here.”
I told Special Agent Devane I was onto a story, and I was starting
to get scared. She asked me to wait while she called her superior. A few
minutes later she came out and handed me a piece of paper with her name and
another agent’s on it, and the time and place I should meet with them.
“2 P.M. 9-10-98, 310 Grand Avenue, Oakland, CA” it read. Below that, Devane
wrote down her mobile phone number.
Three days later I went to the FBI office on Grand Avenue in
Oakland. I brought a number of documents along with me including the evidence
of URS insider stock options, and the white paper I co-wrote for the City of
Tustin in 1983, which helped kill the first high-speed rail initiative by
exposing special interests. This turned out to be ironic, like everything over
time.
Devane came out and asked me to follow her, escorting me into a
back room where she introduced me to her superior, an intense black man in his
mid-forties with hard eyes. He introduced himself: “I’m Special Agent Carl
Chandler,” he said, not extending his hand. He asked me to sit down and tell
him why I’d come.
I told the agents I was working on a story that seemed to have
taken an unexpected turn, and said I was afraid of what might be in store for
me if I dug any deeper. I gave them my documents, and they asked if they could
copy them. Then they asked what I wanted from the Bureau.
I said I wanted their protection, so I could finish the story in
one piece and get it into print. Chandler and Devane thanked me for coming, in
and bringing the material. Then they asked if there was anything else that I
wanted from the Bureau. “Just one thing,” I said. “What’s that?” asked Special
Agent Chandler. “I want to be there when you take Willie Brown out of City Hall
in shackles,” I said.
I went back to the FBI a half-dozen times, once in 1999, twice in
2000, once in 2001, once in 2002 and once in 2005. I hand-carried to them
computer diskettes and reams of paper full of facts and chronologies,
additional factual documentary evidence provided by the principals through
their public financial statements, news stories, records of political campaign
contributions, and corporate financial records. As far as I can tell, nothing
was ever done with it. I might just as well have thrown it in the ocean.
The FBI wasn’t the only investigative agency to ignore the story.
In late 1998, I called up Wayne Imberi, an old friend who worked
at the California Fair Political Practices Commission in Sacramento. The FPPC
is the state watchdog agency in California, created by legislation sponsored by
Jerry Brown when he was California’s Secretary of State. I told Imberi what I
had and he set me up with an investigator named Donna Morrow. I gave her a copy
of the 28-page story I’d written on the Bay Bridge and she told me she’d get
back to me.
When I hadn’t heard anything for a month, I called her back and
asked her whether the FPPC had begun an investigation. She said she didn’t
recall the matter. “It’s all there in the document I brought you,” I said, “Why
don’t you try reading it, and call me if you have any questions.” I never heard
from Donna Morrow, after that admittedly sharp response.
In 1999, I tried another federal agency. This time it was the
Securities Exchange Commission, at their office in San Francisco. An
investigator named Christopher Cooke came out to speak to me. I told Cooke the
same story I’d told the FBI and FPPC agents: there was a scam going down
involving transportation issues that were being used as vehicles to manipulate
publicly traded stocks; that the insiders at these corporations, and their political
allies, knew a deal was in the works that would yield multi-billion-dollar
no-bid contracts for certain corporations, and they were using this knowledge
to make themselves a killing on insider trades. I voiced the opinion that all
of this was illegal the last time I looked, and gave Christopher Cooke another
pile of documents and a diskette. He gave me his card and thanked me for coming
in.
Two years later, I called the SEC office in Los Angeles and told
their chief investigator there, Tom Zambrano, all about Transcam and my
dealings with Christopher Cooke. I said the SEC didn’t appear to be moving
forward with an investigation. Zambrano gave me the name and phone number of
Robert Mitchell, another investigator in the San Francisco SEC office.
In October of 2001 I called Robert Mitchell and spoke with him for
twenty minutes or so. I wrote him a letter early the next year, asking if the
SEC could possibly investigate my claims about Willie Brown, Dianne Feinstein,
Richard Blum and friends. No agency would move against this well-connected,
politically wired machine.
In 2002, I filled out a 211 “whistleblower” claim with the IRS. I
showed Michael Hunter and Todd Andersen, the two IRS special agents with whom I
met all my files and charts. They copied all of it, and told me they found me a
credible witness and were recommending an investigation to their superiors at
the next level. Whatever level that was, it was silent on the matter.
In early 2005 I called Joel Moss, the FBI agent in charge of the
political corruption division in San Francisco, and spoke to him over the phone
for twenty minutes or so, trying to get an answer to the question of why they
weren’t pressing an investigation into the new high-speed train machinations.
Moss didn’t say much, and I never did get an answer from him or anyone else in
our so-called regulatory agencies.
I also wrote letters to my U.S. Senators and Congressmen in Oregon
and Washington, seeking their help and protection in exchange for my
cooperation with any prosecution of the principals. Nobody responded.
If the investigative agencies were lax, the working press was even
lazier.
On September 29, 1998 I called 60 Minutes in New York and asked to
speak to Mike Wallace. I was acquainted with one of Wallace’s former producers,
Chris Schenyl. Chris told me that if I ever had a major story I should contact
60 Minutes. A few moments passed while the receptionist put me on hold. Then
Mike Wallace came on the line. I told him about the Bay Bridge deal and Willie
Brown. He seemed interested. “Well, who’s going to break the story?” Wallace asked.
I told him that I wasn’t sure just yet, that I was still trying to find an
outlet. “Well, call us when you’ve found someone who’ll break it,” he
said. I didn’t say, “I’m breaking the story now, to you, god damnit!” I
just told him I’d work on that, and started circulating the story more widely.
Again, nothing happened.
In mid-October of 1998 I was tuning my first draft of the Bay
Bridge story. I attempted to tie all the seemingly-disparate pieces together:
the Bay Bridge, Treasure Island and Indian gaming, Catellus Development, John
Foran and Nossaman, Guthner, and the first bullet train scam. I prepared a
boilerplate letter dated October 16, 1998 to accompany the simultaneous
submission of my story, to let editors know that I had all the information
multiply sourced and could provide the documentation to substantiate all my
claims.
The San Francisco Examiner responded favorably, especially their
main investigative reporter Lance Williams. I went in and spent some time with
Lance and Steve Cook, the investigative reporting Sunshine Team’s chief editor.
When I left the building, I was feeling good. A week later, Lance Williams sent
me a letter. It wasn’t so good.
In a letter dated October 30, 1998, Williams wrote: “the paper is
not able to publish your piece as written, but is interested in developing
aspects of your work into a story or stories, as described below.”
What was described below was the Examiner’s offer to publish the
two most difficult and dangerous parts of my story separately. If the stories
made it to the front page of the Sunday paper, I’d be paid $350 per story; if
they made it to page one on another day I’d get $150. I wasn’t being offered a
staff position, nor would I be under the Examiner’s corporate umbrella, which
would have entitled me to legal protection in case I was sued.
One day in March of 1999 I was at the Sacramento Bee and told
editor Bill Moore what I was working on. He asked to see a copy of the story.
He read it and said he didn’t think the Bee would run it. “Willie [Brown] is a
pretty litigious fellow,” Moore said. I told him that I thought newspapers were
in the business of publishing the factual truth, no matter whose toes might get
stepped on, but Moore wouldn’t touch it.
The world of news had radically changed. With the consolidation of
media into a half-dozen mega-corps, it seemed the press was more interested in
ignoring or even suppressing the truth than they were in exposing it.
Four months after I’d finished the first story I contacted the
online journal Salon.com. David Weir, one of my editors from California, was
then Salon’s Managing Editor. I emailed Weir some stories. By then I’d decided
to chop the long narrative up into discrete AP-style pieces. Weir emailed me
back, expressing an interest in publishing my work. He put me in touch with
editor Darryl Lindsey, and we set up a meeting in early May 1999 at Salon’s
office in downtown San Francisco.
Lindsay and I began to talk. Lindsay was interested in the URS
stuff, but told me that he “couldn’t see Willie” in it. Richard Tolmach had
offered the same opinion when I showed him the first draft in late 1998, but
Lindsay and I managed to work out a deal by the end of the first meeting. Salon
would publish my stories starting with the URS Griner issue and then run six
subsequent pieces for a $1000 each, plus expenses.
Lindsay also agreed to my request for expenses to travel to
Vancouver, B.C., where I wanted to interview Li Ka Shing, the reclusive Hong
Kong billionaire who had backed out of the Treasure Island development deal. I
felt he was a critical link in unraveling the chain. I went back home and
waited for the contract to arrive by mail, as Lindsay had promised.
A week later the contract arrived, but before I signed it, I talked with Lindsay again and found that he wanted me to interview Richard Blum. I told Lindsay that I was certainly prepared to do that but I first wanted to have the entirety of our deal in writing.
A week later the contract arrived, but before I signed it, I talked with Lindsay again and found that he wanted me to interview Richard Blum. I told Lindsay that I was certainly prepared to do that but I first wanted to have the entirety of our deal in writing.
We dickered back and forth for a week. Then Lindsay told me to
sign the contract and interview Blum. I told him I wasn’t about to do that
unless the deal was in place; that Salon would run the whole series, and send
me to Vancouver. “What’s this about Vancouver?” he asked. I reminded him of
what we discussed but he said he didn’t remember it. We came to no satisfactory
agreement, and I had to move on.
Later that summer, I thought I’d finally found an outlet that
would publish my stories when I met John Mecklin of the alternative Bay Area
newspaper SF Weekly. Mecklin and his paper had published some hard-hitting
investigative stories on Willie Brown’s ethically questionable doings,
including a piece on Willie’s investments in property that was under the aegis
of Catellus Development. Mecklin and I sat in his office discussing the project
for close to an hour. He was interested in the URS stock issuances during the
Bay Bridge process too, but like others didn’t see Willie in the deal. I told
him he would if he ran the whole series; that it was through the interconnected
issues and the relationships of all the players that Willie Brown’s guiding
hand could be seen.
By the end of that meeting, we had a deal. Mecklin agreed to pay
me $3200 for the URS story.
A week or so later the deal fell apart. Mecklin thought an email
I’d sent them had put them in jeopardy, and Richard Blum might sue them. When I
read the email to Lance Williams over the phone, he said he didn’t see a
problem. “That’s nothing,” he said. “All you did was state some facts and
your belief that Richard Blum and Dianne Feinstein were involved in something
sleazy.” At any rate, Mecklin killed the story, although he was decent enough
to pay me an $850 kill fee.
I couldn’t understand why a story of this magnitude had become so
difficult to sell, and asked some of my colleagues what they thought. ”When
magazines like California died, there went your market, Richard.” Dan Walters
of the Sacramento Bee said to me one day at his office. Bill Moore told me that
investigative journalism wasn’t dead, but that now newspapers would only
publish hard-hitting investigative stories written by staff members.
I’d heard that same story from the Capitol bureau correspondent of
the Wall Street Journal. Former Mayor of Sacramento Burnett Miller had a
similar opinion: “When the Bee went from a family operation owned by the
McClatchy family to a corporate enterprise they became much more timid,” Miller
told me. Mark Dowie offered a more brutal assessment. “It’s like there’s one
television camera that’s set up in the middle of Kansas, and what that camera
can see is what’s universally accepted as the day’s news.”
By the time I got half way into the book, I’d been turned down by
every mainstream and alternative newspaper in the State of California,
including the Los Angeles Times, Mother Jones, and the San Francisco Bay
Guardian. My record was no better at the national level; everybody from
the Atlantic Monthly to Wired Magazine passed.
California’s public interest groups weren’t any more responsive
than the press or the investigative agencies. They all turned a blind eye to
the story unfolding in their front yard.
The person most responsible for prompting me to cover the Bay
Bridge story was Rick Feher, a member of the design team Coman-Feher. When I
first met with him, Feher described himself as an activist and former
journalist, and a Green Party member. He said he was an ally who wanted to help
me get my story out.
Feher did make one significant contact: the late David Brower.
Brower was a fighter and he had taken on the new board of The Sierra Club,
which he once headed, accusing them of selling out. Brower wrote a story
critical of the Headwaters Forest deal, publishing it in the Chronicle’s
December 23, 1998 edition, characterizing it as a half-billion-dollar
government shakedown. “If we allow tycoons like Charles Hurwitz (the CEO of
Maxxam, the company that owned the Headwaters Forest) to exact hundreds of
millions of dollars by staring down the government, more will line up behind
him,” Brower warned. It was a prophecy that has since proved to be true.
Brower seemed inclined to provide us with some backing, and Feher
outlined his proposal for a project titled “CALTRANCE”, an acronym that stood
for CALifornia TRANsportation Crisis Elimination.
After we’d discussed the project, Brower turned to Feher and asked him “Is there anything I need to sign?” I took that to mean a check. Feher sat there, saying nothing, doing nothing. The activist couldn’t bring himself to act. Once again, talk but no walk.
After we’d discussed the project, Brower turned to Feher and asked him “Is there anything I need to sign?” I took that to mean a check. Feher sat there, saying nothing, doing nothing. The activist couldn’t bring himself to act. Once again, talk but no walk.
In 2005 I traveled to Oakland to meet with my new literary agent
Tom Miller, who was also the corporate counsel for Global Exchange. This was
the same public interest group whose support I had unsuccessfully tried to
enlist in the summer of 2003.
The agent said he had an inside track to a publishing house called
Avalon and asked me to come down to Oakland, where we could meet with Avalon
chief Charlie Winton. Miller also said he thought we could get my stories published
in the Berkeley Daily Planet, a small leftist newspaper. We met with Winton,
but he didn’t want to risk publishing my book.
A few months later the Berkeley Daily Planet stiffed me for the
series of stories we had agreed on. I wrote the first four parts of what was
supposed to be a ten-part series and sent them down to the agent who passed
them along to the BDP. Becky O’Malley, the publisher of the BDP then said she
wanted one story, for which she would pay me $50. I told her we had a deal for
a series. When I brought up breach of contract, she told me to get lost. “No
good deed goes unrewarded,” she snidely wrote me in an email. My agent Tom
Miller didn’t press the issue with her, or demand that I be paid for the work
I’d done.
In April of 2005 I traveled back to Oakland to convene another
meeting at Tom Miller’s office. I had prepared a new series of eight political
corruption charts with updated figures and new details. In attendance were my
agent, Emeryville Vice-Mayor Ken Bukowski, Richard Tolmach and myself. The law
firms of Judicial Watch and Terence Hallinan attended the meetings via
speakerphone. Rich Tolmach was standing in for The People’s Advocate, the other
public interest group I had contacted in 2003 during the Recall Gray Davis
campaign.
I had traveled to Sacramento in February 2005 to meet with Tolmach
and his contact at The People’s Advocate headquarters. The People’s Advocate is
the group who brought the Jarvis-Gann property tax limits into being. This is
also the same group who are responsible for instituting term limits, largely in
reaction to the iron reign of Willie Brown. That reaction backfired; now the
only ones who know anything around The Building are lobbyists. The legislators
are too transitory to know much about what’s really happening.
Ted Costa, the People’s Advocate executive director and board
member, volunteered that he had a rich backer who would underwrite the
political corruption litigation. All I had to do was find an attorney who would
take the cases.
I contacted Fred Lerach’s law firm in San Diego and spoke with one
of their main attorneys, Dave Walton. Lerach’s firm is a formidable bunch of
litigators, and they’ve taken a number of controversial cases regarding
securities fraud and public corruption. Walton passed on the cases, but
referred me to the LA law firm Sturmgasser & Woocher.
Fred Woocher was with the FPPC when the Political Reform Act went
through in 1974, so he knew the law well. Tom Miller and I went to Woocher’s
office in Santa Monica on June 13, 2005.
Initially Woocher seemed interested; then he got cold feet and cancelled out later that summer, after I did more work on the project pro bono. This consisted of documenting Mehdi Morshed’s stock holdings in transportation firms, and his wife Linda’s contracts for work on the high-speed rail project.
Initially Woocher seemed interested; then he got cold feet and cancelled out later that summer, after I did more work on the project pro bono. This consisted of documenting Mehdi Morshed’s stock holdings in transportation firms, and his wife Linda’s contracts for work on the high-speed rail project.
I next tried Eugene Scheiman of the east coast firm McCarter and
English, referred to him by Daniel Sheehan, the Pentagon Papers attorney who
formerly headed The Christic Institute. Scheiman seemed interested and asked me
to prepare some more material. I did. Scheiman passed on the cases in late
2006.
Between 2005 and 2007 I contacted every public interest group I
could think of. I tried Common Cause, the Green Party, and Ralph Nader, all for
a second time. Nobody would help. Then I went to all the investigative agencies
again, including the IRS and the U.S. Attorney’s office in Sacramento. My agent
wrote the U.S. Attorney in Sacramento McGregor Scott a sincere letter on May
24, 2005, asking for an investigation. He described the two assaults I had
suffered, and the story that I was working on. Once again, nothing happened.
I went to The Project on Government Oversight in early 2005,
recommended to them by Daniel Ellsberg. I tried The Committee to Protect
Journalists in late 2006. Then I filed another whistleblower claim with the
U.S. Department of Transportation Auditor General, then another with the
California State Auditor’s office in 2009. They all did nothing. I went to
every public interest law firm I could get hold of out of the Yellow Pages.
They offered encouragement but gave no real support.
Jeff Baird, the Catellus Desert Wildlands whistle blower was
accorded the same heads-buried-in-the-sand response by law enforcement, as were
a number of U.S. Customs agents who filed suit on a tangentially related case.
Baird voiced his concerns about the Catellus desert land swaps to
the FBI, the SEC, and the Department of the Interior. He also sent letters to
U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft and President George W. Bush. Of course
there was no reply from George or John. Return letters from the SEC (dated
April 10, 2001) and the Department of the Interior (dated May 3, 2001) thanked
Baird for writing them and said they’d pass his letters on to the proper
agencies. “They blew me off,” says Baird, shaking his head disgustedly. “I
couldn’t believe it. It was a thanks, but no thanks kind of deal.”
Everywhere I turned, there was no relief, but this had become old
hat for me, dating back to my assignment in June of 1997, to write a magazine
story about the new Bay Bridge design competition. Six weeks after I was given
that assignment I was assaulted on a city street in Sacramento. I woke up in
the hospital four days later. For months after that I was barely ambulatory,
and I am permanently disabled as a result of my injuries. I can’t prove it had
to do with my reporting, but who thought transportation and land use issues
could prove so potentially dangerous?
Finally, publisher Kris Millegan of TrineDay took
on the story, and after several years, we now have the book, Paradise Lost?.
I did what I did for what I think are good reasons, and there is
no way I can undo that, even if I wanted to. I can’t put the genie back in the
bottle. I knew who and what I was taking on… or maybe I didn’t, but I surely do
now.
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